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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
I 
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4 
RENDERS THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT VOID 
Plaintiffs argue [p. 5 of their brief] that the 
Appellant (Defendant) must overcome the "giant hurdle" 
(Plaintiffs' term) of establishing the Defendant was not 
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personally served with the summons. Plaintiff 
misconstrues who actually has the "giant hurdle". It is 
the Plaintiffs who must establish that he WAS VALIDLY 
SERVED! Without proper service, there is no obligation to 
appear and the judgment, entered in assumed "default", IS 
VOID. Utah case law (Garcia vs Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah 
1986) allows an attack through Rule 60(b)(7) to be 
made at any time, BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT IS VOID! 
Proper service of process IS JURISDICTIONAL to the 
case! Without valid service, the court has NO 
JURISDICTION over the defendant and cannot enter a valid 
judgment. A default judgment entered upon the non-
appearance of an invalidly-served defendant is VOID! 
The case of Wisden vs Bangerter, 793 P. 2d 1057 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1995) is clearly inappropriate. Wisden 
involved a plaintiff, who knew his case had been 
adjudicated! That plaintiff was simply late in bringing 
his appeal. In this case, it is the Defendant who, 
because of the defective service, was not properly 
brought into the proceedings who has a very legitimate 
reason to challenge the void judgment! 
Plaintiffs' Brief [pp. 6-7] mistates the facts and 
misrepresent the law on the issue of the "usual place of 
abode". That phrase is one of legal significance! As used 
in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and as 
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that phrase has been historically interpreted [Grant vs 
Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931 (1910)] and applied 
to be the location where the person resides at the time 
he is actually served. The Defendant at the time of 
service of the summons (28 September 1992) was NOT living 
in Missouri at the Appleton address with his wife; he was 
LIVING IN TEXAS. This fact is (was) implicitly admitted 
by counsel in his letter to the Missouri sheriff, even 
before service of process was attempted. 
That the Defendant attended [as described in page 8 
of Plaintiff's Brief] a family barbecue in Missouri in 
May 1992 THREE MONTHS BEFORE the defective service of 
process was even attempted is absolutely immaterial and 
irrelevant to the instant issue. All that can be said 
concerning the May 1992 family barbecue is that the 
Defendant attended that barbecue! So what? The inference 
might but is not required to be drawn that he lived 
in Missouri. So what? That was in May! The simple fact 
remains: the Defendant was not "personally served" at 
"his usual place of abode", per Grant vs Lawrence, supra! 
A fact implicitly admitted by Plaintiffs' counsel even 
before the fact in his letter to the Missouri sheriff. 
Plaintiffs' Brief [p. 9] is full of all kinds of 
assumed but not established "facts", certainly not 
material to the issue of the invalidity of service. 
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Plaintiffs argue [p. 9-10 of their Brief] that they 
are only required to use "reasonable efforts" to serve 
process upon the Defendant. No! The Plaintiffs have the 
burden of properly serving the defendant, according to 
the standards prescribed by Rule 4 and interpreted by 
cases such as Grant vs Lawrence, supra. The Plaintiffs' 
citation to In re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993) , is inappropriate, because it is obvious from 
the case decision that Mr Schwenke was served and was 
aware of the proceedings against him! 
The Plaintiffs misread the effect and rationale of 
Garcia vs Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah Supreme Court 1990) . 
Garcia was decided not because the Supreme Court was 
"chagrined" [Plaintiff's term, p. 10 of their Brief] 
because the summons could have been left with the 
defendant in that case; Garcia was decided on the basis 
that the plaintiffs simply did NOT follow the clear 
mandate of Rule 4 and the court thus had no jurisdiction 
over the defendant! That's exactly what we have here: 
Rule 4's prescriptions have not been followed! Nikki 
the wife was served; Steven who was NOT living there 
at the time wasn't. Plaintiffs have an obligation to 
insure that they caused to be served the right person in 
the right manner; otherwise, the court is without 
jurisdiction. That the Plaintiffs waited laterally until 
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the last possible minute to attempt the service of 
process cannot avail them when that service is invalidly 
effected, because they served the wrong address. 
The trial court is simply without jurisdiction over 
the Defendant and any judgment entered against him is 
void! Garcia, supra. See also Woody vs Rhodes, 461 P.2d 
465 (Utah Supreme Court 1969). 
II 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
The default judgment should be set aside if only 
on equitable principles. The Defendant did not appear 
until he was properly notified via the garnishment 
proceeding that a judgment had been entered. The 
Plaintiffs' brief [p. 13] correctly acknowledges the 
law's "preference" for trying cases on their merits. The 
Plaintiffs' attempted character assassination of the 
Defendant through repetitious statements concerning 
alleged conduct or misconduct are immaterial to this 
case, in which the Plaintiffs have simply not effected 
service in the manner prescribed. 
The underlying obligation is NOT, in theory, the 
renewal of a judgment (as Plaintiff has incorrectly 
pleaded the case), but rather whether or not the 
Defendant paid the mortgage requirements. The payment (or 
non-payment) of mortgage obligations are established by 
documentary evidence. We are dealing here not with a case 
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which like a traffic accident must of necessity deal 
with witnesses' perceptions and recollections, which fade 
with the passage of time. Plaintiffs have not claimed 
nor, given their own lack of diligence in pursuing the 
case in the first instance any disadvantage or 
prejudice due to the length of time. For the most part, 
the delay in the case has been either of their own making 
or certainly because of their own choice! 
One must also wonder if a default judgment had been 
entered against the Plaintiffs if they would be quite so 
cavalier about arguing that "reasonable efforts" (in 
attempted compliance with Rule 4) were sufficient basis 
to uphold the default judgment against them. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly assert [p. 14] that the Court 
could on "stipulation" have amended the judgment and 
issued it in the name of Laurel Caldwell. While such 
might have been done had the Defendant actually been 
there to so "stipulate", he wasn't there! Because he was 
not properly served and was not notified of the 
proceeding! That the plaintiffs upon "stipulation" 
might have been able to correct a lot of things in the 
case does not overcome the Plaintiffs7 failure in the 
fatal mistakes that they made! 
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Ill 
PLAINTIFFS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 54(c) (2) 
The Plaintiffs argue [pp. 13-14 of their Brief] that 
the Defendant has not been prejudiced by the subtle 
"switch" which was effected in the pleadings and the 
judgment actually entered. 
The issue is whether or not the Plaintiffs have 
followed the Rules. Rule 54(c) (2) requires the judgment 
to conform to the pleadings (complaint), by providing: 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default 
shall not be different in kind from, or exceed 
the amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
Emphasis added. 
The pleadings (complaint) initially alleged the 
action was brought by Nelda Wall "in behalf of the Estate 
of Hal E Wall". The Plaintiffs admit [p. 13] that there 
were no formal probate proceedings for Hal Wall, 
deceased. Thus, Nelda Wall simply as surviving spouse--
-has no legal authority to bring an action "in behalf of 
the estate" of her deceased husband, unless and until she 
is lawfully appointed as Personal Representative or 
Special Administrator pursuant to court order, entered 
pursuant to the Probate Code [Title 75 of the Utah Code] . 
The critical issue here is NOT whether there is an 
"estate" of Hal E Wall; the dispositive issue is whether 
or not Nelda not legally appointed to do so may bring 
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and maintain an action "in behalf of the estate" of a 
deceased person. She cannot! 
Stevens vs Collard, 837 P. 2d 593 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1992), holds that the trial court is to examine 
the face of the pleadings and decide whether or not a 
default judgment can be supported. There are two reasons 
in this case why the proffered "default judgment" cannot 
be supported, from the face of the pleadings. First, it 
should have been obvious to Judge Noel that the action 
was not one to "renew" the previous divorce judgment, 
that Nelda was not and could not be a party to that 
original (1982) divorce "judgment", so as to be able to 
"renew" the same. Secondly, it should have been obvious 
that Nelda Wall had no legal authority to bring the 
action "in behalf of the estate" of Hal Wall, deceased. 
The Plaintiffs assert [p. 14 of their Brief] that 
the trial court could "amend the judgment and issue it 
into the name of plaintiff Laurel Caldwell, who could 
assign the judgment to Nelda F Wall." While this could 
possibly have been done had the Defendant been there 
and had the Defendant agreed, which is NOT the case the 
fact remains that it was not so done! 
That the default judgment "does nothing more than 
implement the practicalities of the situation in an 
equitable way" [p. 14 of Plaintiffs7 Brief] is incorrect. 
9 
Rule 54(c)(2) requires strict conformity with the 
original pleadings; otherwise, the whole integrity of the 
system is subject to abuse. 
That the Plaintiffs are now willing to have no 
objection to an amendment of the default judgment to be 
issued in name of Laurel Caldwell does not correct the 
errors Plaintiffs have made. In fact, this statement 
alone implicitly acknowledges the correctness of the 
Defendant's assertions: that Nelda F Wall is not the 
correct party to be bringing the action. Thus, the 
default judgment entered in her name (Nelda F Wall) is, 
for the foregoing reasons, facially defective and cannot 
be allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court DOES have jurisdiction, at any time, to 
entertain a motion to set aside a VOID JUDGMENT even a 
default judgment improperly entered because of a lack 
of personal service, as required by Rule 4. Garcia, 
supra. The summons was NOT served upon the Defendant 
Steven D Caldwell "at his usual place of abode", which, 
per Grant vs Lawrence is the place he was living at the 
time service was made; it was served upon Nikki, at her 
residence. Rule 4 has not been complied with; the default 
judgment is simply void! 
The default judgment ought to be set aside on 
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equitable grounds. The Defendant has not had "his day in 
court", has promptly responded when he first became aware 
of the proceeding, and the Plaintiffs' have claimed no 
prejudice in trying the case on the merits. Most if not 
all of the delay is attributable to the inaction of the 
Plaintiffs. 
Nelda F Wall not being legally appointed as the 
Personal Representative has no authority to bring an 
action "in behalf of the estate" of any deceased person! 
The judgment is facially defective. The Plaintiffs' non-
compliance with Rule 54(c) (2) further makes the default 
judgment defective. 
The trial court's decision (to uphold the 
previously-entered default judgment) must be overturned. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September, 
1997. 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEVEN D CALDWELL 
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